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UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: THE
EXPERT PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
In May of 1965, a person wearing wraparound sunglasses and a
straw hat robbed a credit union in Warren, Michigan, escaping with
nearly $5,000. A manager, an employee, and a customer witnessed the
crime but on the same afternoon were unable to identify the robber,
either from a book of mug shops or from a lineup. On the next day,
the manager and the employee identified Louis Nasir first from a book
of mug shots and then from a one-man show-up through a one-way
glass. Nasir had not participated in the first lineup, although his mug
shot may have been among those viewed by the witnesses on the day
of the robbery. All three eyewitnesses identified Nasir as the robber
from a lineup on the following Monday. There was no indication of
unfairness or undue suggestion in the lineup itself.
At trial the sole issue was identification and the jury convicted
Nasir, apparently choosing to believe the three eyewitnesses rather than
six witnesses who placed Nasir at work on the day of the robbery.
Nasir served 375 days in prison before being released after an accomplice
of the now-dead robber confessed. Yet all three witnesses had expressed
absolute certainty in their identifications of Nasir, who did resemble the
actual robber.'
This is but one of the many instances of conviction of innocent
people based on mistaken eyewitness identifications.' Although there are
numerous examples, it is very difficult to know how many innocent
people have been convicted because, as in the Nasir case, it is very
difficult to distinguish correct from incorrect identifications. In many
of the cases the discovery of the mistake was purely a stroke of luck, 3
while in others, such as the Nasir case, it was the result of diligent
post-conviction investigation by defense counsel or the police detectives
who participated in the case. 4
One frequently-suggested method of safeguarding against convictions
based on misidentification is the use of expert testimony on the unre-
liability of eyewitness evidence by cognitive psychologists. Trial courts
* Copyright 1985, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 197-99, 205 N.W.2d 461, 482-83 app. A
(1973).
2. See id. for two other examples of Michigan cases. See also, e.g., E. Borchard,
Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (1932); P. Wall, Eye-Witness Iden-
tification in Criminal Cases (1965).
3. See, e.g., E. Borchard, supra note 2, at 8.
4. See, e.g., id. at 1.
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frequently have admitted such testimony,' as was the case in a recent
Louisiana trial. In State v. Chapman,6 the trial court permitted Dr.
Robert Buckhout to testify about his experimental research, "which
tended to discredit eyewitness identification generally." '7 However, when
trial courts have excluded such testimony, the defense has nearly always
been unsuccessful in obtaining a reversal on appeal.8 The Louisiana
Supreme Court recently joined the many other courts which have con-
sidered the admissibility of expert psychological testimony on eyewitness
unreliability. In State v. Stucke,9 the court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Buckhout,
who would have testified as to the results of his own studies with the
purpose of enlightening "the jury as to the quality of the victim's
identification so that the jury would have a standard against which they
could make an evaluation of the victim's identification."'' 0 The court
concluded that, because it found a substantial risk that the expert's
testimony would be given excessive weight relative to the other evidence,
the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value,
that it would invade the province of the jury, and that it would not
aid the jury." In so finding, the court followed the overwhelming
majority of courts.' 2 In a concurrence, Justice Lemmon added that where
justice requires, the judge may admit such testimony if, in his discretion,
he finds that the offered expert testimony would aid the jury on the
question of identity. 3
In light of this holding, a defense attorney might be uncertain of
what approach to take when facing potentially unreliable eyewitness
evidence. In such a situation, defense counsel should be aware of the
5. For example, as of 1978, Dr. Robert Buckhout had testified in at least thirty-
two trials, Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Criminal
Defense 9 (Sept.-Oct. 1977); by 1981 he had testified as an expert in more than sixty
trials and pre-trial suppression hearings, see Buckhout & Greenwald, Witness Psychology,
in Scientific and Expert Evidence 1291, 1296-97 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
6. 436 So. 2d 451, 453 n.6 (La. 1983).
7. 436 So. 2d at 453.
8. Of the many cases involving the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness
unreliability, there have been few reversals of trial court exclusion of such testimony. As
this article went to press, this writer was aware of only two such decisions, one of which
was decided too recently to be given any treatment in the text. See State v. Chapple,
135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 147-48;
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) (discussed
infra note 147). For a discussion of the treatment by the majority of courts, see infra
notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
9. 419 So. 2d 939 (La. 1982).
10. 419 So. 2d at 944.
11. Id. at 945.
12. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
13. 419 So. 2d at 951.
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factors which cause eyewitness unreliability, the results of psychological
research on the subject, how these results can be used with or without
expert testimony, and how the courts have dealt with such expert tes-
timony. Before discussing the legal arguments and possible approaches,
it is first necessary to summarize how eyewitness evidence can be made
unreliable.
The Psychology of Eyewitness Identification
A person's ability to identify another person depends on his capacity
to perceive, remember, and articulate what occurs before him. That the
processes of perception, memory, and articulation are subject to defects
which might affect the reliability of eyewitness evidence has become a
focal point for analysis and psychological research.' 4 Additionlly inter-
rogation can cause inaccuracies in eyewitness evidence, particularly iden-
tifications: suggestive photo or physical lineup procedures can contribute
to misidentification. However, such effects are not the central concern
of this paper and thus will be treated only incidentally.
Of the three cognitive processes mentioned above, perception and
memory have been at the center of attention for the experimental psy-
chologists in their studies of eyewitness evidence. Some features of
articulation are often considered in studies of memory, which is broken
down into three stages for analysis: encoding or acquisition, storage or
retention, and retrieval. 5
Perception
At its most basic level, perception is the operation of the physical
senses such as sight, smell, etc., but as a process it is much more. It
is a social as well as a physical process in that human observers are
motivated by the desire to be accurate and by the desire to live up to
others' expectations and desires.' 6 It is highly selective because the num-
ber of signals or amount of information impinging upon the senses is
so great that the mind can process only a small fraction of the incoming
data. 7 Also, it is an interpretive process in that "our perceptions are
14. For leading surveys of the psychological aspects see E. Loftus, Eyewitness Tes-
timony (1979); A. Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979). See also I.
Horowitz & T. Willging, The Psychology of Law: Integration and Applications 230-238
(1984).
15. See Penrod, Loftus, & Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A
Psychological Perspective, in The Psychology of the Courtroom 119 (N. Kerr & R. Bray
eds. 1982).
16. Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identification, 2 L. & Psychology Rev. 75,
76 (1976).
17. A. Trankell, Reliability of Evidence: Methods for Analyzing and Assessing Witness
Statements 16 (1972). See also C. Bartol, Psychology and American Law 170 (1983).
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inevitably colored by personal material which is mingled with the actual
sense data": 8 Such data are meaningless unless processed in light of
experience, learning, preferences, biases, and expectations. 9 These fea-
tures have important implications when a crime is involved for when a
person witnesses a crime he is
engaged in what can be described as "one-shot perception,"
that is, the selection and storage of information without an
opportunity to rehearse what was seen in order to stabilize his
memory. . . . [T]he human observer is able to take the fragments
of information to which there is time to pay attention (i.e., he
actively reduces the information) and reach conclusions based
on prior experience, familiarity, biases, expectancy, faith, desire
to appear certain, and so forth.20
Another implication of the selectivity of perception is that gaps in
information will exist, which the observer will fill by choosing details
which may logically but incorrectly complete the picture.2 ' Because per-
ception and memory closely interact, factors which cause unreliability
in both will be discussed after the general features of memory are treated.
Memory
Contrary to the position taken by some, 22 human memory does not
operate like a camera, gathering every detail for later recall exactly as
it was perceived. Rather, it is an active, reconstructive process in which
images are constantly altered through the integration of new experiences
and interpretations. 23 A person can unknowingly integrate post-event
information to fill gaps or replace forgotten or poorly remembered
details, with imagination frequently playing a significant role. 24 The result
can be distorted or totally incorrect recall.
As noted earlier, experimental psychologists have treated memory as
a three stage process. Encoding involves the input of perceived infor-
mation into the memory system; the point of acquisition is that "at
which perception registers in the various areas of the cortex and is
initially stored. ' 25 Storage, or retention, is that part of the process
18. A. Trankell, supra note 17, at 17.
19. Id. at 16-17. See also C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 170.
20. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 5, 6.
21. A. Trankell, supra note 17, at 18.
22. See, e.g., H. Arons, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation 35 (1967).
23. See C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 171; A. Trankell, supra note 17, at 21. See
also E. Loftus, Memory: Surprising New Insights into How We Remember and Why We
Forget (1980).
24. A. Trankell, supra note 17, at 23.
25. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 170. See also Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note
15, at 123.
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during which the information is retained until it is to be recalled, with
the lapse of time between encoding and retrieval being called the "re-
tention interval." ' 26 Finally, the retrieval stage is that in which what is
commonly called "remembering" occurs: "the brain searches for the
pertinent information, retrieves it, and communicates it. ' ' 27
One important feature common to both perception and memory is
that people are not conscious of these processes. They may be aware
of the end results, but research indicates that they do not realize how
the processes of perception, encoding, retention, and retrieval can ma-
nipulate and change the original information. 28 This is a significant
feature of perception and memory for those who must deal with eyew-
itness evidence. 29
Factors Affecting Reliability
The factors which affect the reliability of eyewitness performance
operate on both perception and memory, and are classified according
to their source. Those associated with the eyewitness himself are called
witness factors, while those arising from the event being observed are
called situational or event factors.30 Some factors will overlap both
categories since the distinction between the categories is analytical rather
than real. This classification reflects the typical experimental approach
in which one variable or factor is studied while the others are controlled,
or remain constant. As the effects of each of the factors are discussed
it should be kept in mind that "other things remaining the same" is
implicit in what is said. This isolation of variables one at a time has
implications for the applicability of the research which will be discussed
below.
A third set of factors, particular to recognition of faces, is sometimes
classified as defendant factors. 3 These will be discussed separately even
though, strictly speaking, they can be classified either as witness or as
situational factors. Also, those factors peculiar to the retrieval stage,
i.e., those associated with the mode of interrogation, will be treated
only briefly.
26. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 134.
27. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 171. See also Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note
15, at 138.
28. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 170-71.
29. See infra text accompanying note 121.
30. See C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 171-72; Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note
15, at 123-24. See also Buckhout, supra note 5, at 6; E. Loftus, supra note 14, at 23-
51.
31. See C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 171-72, 181-86; Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra
note 15, at 146-49.
19851
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
Witness Factors' The most obvious factors affecting perception are
the physical limitations on the eyewitness's own senses." Each individual
has unique upper limitations on his abilities to see, hear, taste, smell,
touch; anything causing the eyewitness to function beyond these limits
will reduce the reliability of the eyewitness's performance. A related
factor is a witness's physical orientation or deployment of his senses at
the time of the event. 33
Stimulus overload occurs when the senses are overwhelmed with too
much information in too short a period of time, a condition affecting
both perception and memory. 34 The effect on perception is that the
witness simply is unable to sense everything that happens and may
misperceive some of the information, resulting in later storage of in-
accurate and incomplete information. Also, this phenonenon raises the
opportunity for confabulation, i.e., the creation or substitution of false
memories through later suggestion. Related to stimulus overload is the
level of excitement, stress, and sensory arousal. Research indicates that
very high and very low states of arousal reduce accuracy while moderate
levels may increase accuracy, contrary to the commonly held belief that
high arousal or stress increases accuracy. 3 However, this relationship is
not simple. It depends on the complexity or difficulty of the witness's
task in recalling the event. If the task is highly complex or difficult,
high arousal will decrease accuracy while moderate levels will improve
it; if the task has low complexity or difficulty, high arousal may enhance
accuracy.3 6 In addition, high arousal may induce a witness to pay less
attention to his surroundings. In a crime situation, the witness may be
concerned with personal safety or the safety of someone close to him,
and if he is the victim, he "will focus intensely on some of the personally
relevant cues," such as a weapon.3 7 Arousal is both a situation and a
witness factor, and one must distinguish between the level of excitement
experienced by the witness or victim and the actual level of violence,
at least for theoretical purposes (it would be difficult to do practically).38
A person's expectations and stereotypes can also affect both perception
and memory: what he perceives and encodes is, to a large extent,
determined by cultural biases, personal prejudices, effects of training,
prior information, and expectations induced by motivational states, among
32. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 122.
33. Id.
34. C, Bartol, supra note 17, at 172.
35. Id. at 175-77. See also Katz & Reid, Expert Testimony on the Fallibility of
Eyewitness Identification, I Crim. Just. J. 177, 184-86 (1977) (citing cases in which the
court adhered to the erroneous belief that high arousal increases eyewitness accuracy).
36. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 176.
37. Id. at 177.
38. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 127-28.
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others.3 9 For example, in one experiment a "semi-dramatic" photograph
was shown to a wide variety of subjects, including whites and blacks
of varying backgrounds. The photograph showed several people sitting
in a subway car, with a black man standing and conversing with a
white man, who was also standing, but holding a razor. Over half of
the subjects reported that the black man had been holding the razor,
and several described the black man as "brandishing it wildly." '40 Ef-
fectively, expectations and stereotypes cause people to see and remember
what they want or expect to see or to remember. This phenomenon
should be of concern to the criminal justice system as "[tihere is evidence
that some people may in fact incorporate their stereotype of 'criminal'
in their identification of suspects. . . . [One study] suggests that many
people have stereotypes about how 'deviants' and criminals are supposed
to look.'' 4
1
The accuracy of perception and encoding also depends on how well
"prepared" the witness is to receive and process the information. The
kind of pre-exposure instructions or information the witness has will
affect his ability to concentrate on essential details; the required depth
of processing (e.g., is he asked to assess another person's honesty or
attractiveness) will affect how the witness looks at the person and how
he integrates the information with what he already knows; and the
presence or absence of verbal labels such a signs or captions on pictures
simplifies the witness's task.
42
Event or Situational Factors. The shorter the time available for ob-
servation, the less complete will be perception and recall. While accuracy
will diminish as the rapidity of the event increases (i.e., as exposure
time declines), both accuracy and completeness will increase as the
frequency of exposure increases.4 3 The experimental results clarify the
distinction between recall memory and recognition memory. The former
refers to the ability to remember and describe details of what was
observed, while the latter refers to the ability to identify a person or
thing as being the one previously seen. The accuracy of both is increased
by an increase in exposure time; however, the accuracy of recall memory
decreases with increasing complexity of the event, while that of rec-
ognition memory increases with increased complexity. 44
The nature of the crime is another factor that may affect memory.
39. Id. at 129-30. See also A. Trankell, supra note 17, at 18-19.
40. E. Loftus, supra note 14, at 37-39.
41. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 178. See also. Goldstein, The Fallibility of the
Eyewitness: Psychological Evidence, in Psychology in the Legal Process 223, 236 (B. Sales
ed. 1977).
42. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 130-34.
43. Id. at 124-25; C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 172.
44. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 125.
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Some researchers suggest that accuracy of memory will improve as the
seriousness of the crime increases. 45 For example, a witness may have
better recall of the theft of an auto than of the theft of a pencil. This
is presumably because the less serious the event, the less attention and
energy the witness is likely to devote to it. Nonetheless, the more serious
the offense, the more likely is the witness to choose a suspect from a
lineup even if the perpetrator is not present.4 6 On the other hand, studies
suggest that the more violent the act, the lower will be the accuracy
and completeness of perception and memory. 47 This reduced accuracy
would result from the higher level of arousal or excitement that a more
violent crime would produce. Also, possibly because of the divided
attention that would result, recall of violent events may decline as the
number of perpetrators increases. 48 Accuracy and completeness of mem-
ory will decline as the retention interval increases simply because we
tend to forget more as time passes, and because the passage of time
increases the opportunities for confabulation. 49
In the retrieval stage, accuracy and completeness of eyewitness evidence
depends on several factors. The nature of the questions is important.
Free narrative questions tend to produce more accurate but less complete
responses, while direct, or controlled narrative questions tend to give
lower accuracy but greater completeness. 0 Biased questions, such as
leading questions or those with biased terms (such as "smashed" or
"clobbered" rather than "hit" or "contacted") enhance the opportunity
for suggestion to fill gaps or replace poorly remembered details.5 In
addition, undue suggestion and confabulation can result from multiple
retrievals, from biases in lineup instructions, and the use of hypnosis.5 2
45. Id. at 128-29; C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 173.
46. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 128-29. See also C. Bartol, supra
note 17, at 174.
47. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 175; Clifford, Eyewitness Testimony: The Bridging
of a Credibility Gap, in Psychology, Law and Legal Processes 167, 176-77 (D. Farrington,
K. Hawkins & S. Lloyd-Bostock eds. 1979).
48. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 175.
49. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 134-38; A. Trankell, supra note
17, at 23.
50. Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, supra note 15, at 138-39. A free narrative question
calls for the witness to describe his recollection freely, without prompting or requests for
specific details. For example, "What did you see that evening?" would be a free narrative
question. A controlled narrative question, on the other hand, would require the witness
to give his recollection of specific details, as requested by the interrogator. For example,
"What did the assailant do when he reached the corner?" would be a controlled narrative
question, when asked in a series of similar questions which sequentially lead the witness
through his recall of the events.
51. Id. at 139-40.
52. Id. at 140-44. On hypnosis, see generally Note, Admissibility of Hypnotically
Enhanced Testimony in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1039, 1040-46 (1984) and authorities
cited therein.
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Facial Recognition. One factor which affects the accuracy of eyewitness
identification is the process known as "unconscious transference," or
the tendency to confuse a person seen in one situation with another
person seen in a different situation.13 Loftus argues that this results
from the integration of new information into the memory, with the
consequent transformation of old information. Regardless of the theo-
retical explanation, one aspect of transference has great significance for
those who must deal with eyewitnesses: "in any given case it is nearly
impossible to tell whether transference has occurred or not." '5 4 That a
witness does not realize that transferrence has occurred reduces the
chances for an effective attack on the witness's credibility and strengthens
his image as a believable witness.
Recall of a face depends on the particular face; some are more easily
recalled than others, with uniqueness and attractiveness playing a role.
In any case, research consistently shows that a face seen but once for
a short time will be accurately identified only about 70% of the time
and rarely more than 85% of the time. 5 Accuracy of identification is
also affected by the race of the person observed; the accuracy of
identification of members of one's own race is higher than that of
members of other races.5 6 This result might be explained by the fact
that people are more familiar and have had more experience with mem-
bers of their own race.5 7
Given that these factors operating singly and together can produce
significant unreliability in eyewitness evidence, the question which nat-
urally arises is whether the legal system has recognized the dangers of
such testimony and if so, what safeguards does it have to counteract
the risks involved?
Eyewitness Evidence in the Legal System
The legal profession has long been aware of the problem's existence
and its general nature. Bentham recognized defects in perception and
memory and their effect on the reliability of testimony as early as the
first half of the nineteenth century. 8 Numerous legal commentators have
addressed the subject since then, 9 with some writers such as Borchard
53. E. Loftus, supra note 14, at 142.
54. Id. at 143-44.
55. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 181.
56. Id. at 183-86.
57. Id. at 184-85.
58. J. Bentham, 1 Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice
161-83 (1827).
59. See, e.g., 2 C. Moore, A Treatise on Facts or, the Weight and Value of Evidence
§§ 695-698, at 749-53 (1908) (effect of excitement or fear), §§ 699-701, at 754-57 (effect
of expectations), § 701, at 757-58 (inference as part of the process of perception), § 702,
at 758-59 (effect of bias); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence,
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documenting cases of wrongful convictions based on misidentifications. 6
It is difficult to know the frequency with which innocent persons
are convicted on the basis of eyewitness evidence. Some believe that the
problem of misidentification still exists to nearly the same extent as that
indicated by Borchard. 6' That most of the examples of wrongful con-
viction pre-date the Second World War might suggest (1) that the phe-
nomenon is much less prevalent today, (2) that the risk of wrongful
conviction has been reduced by improvements in the training and ed-
ucation of law enforcement personnel and by greater sensitivity to in-
dividual rights brought about by the civil rights movement and the
decisions of the Warren Court, or (3) that cases like the Geter case in
Texas62 are rarities caused primarily by racial prejudice and the abuse
of prosecutorial discretion rather than a fundamental failure of the
system because of its reliance on eyewitness evidence.
This reasoning might partially explain what cognitive psychologists
describe as the legal system's "uncritical acceptance of eyewitness tes-
timony. '63 Other proffered explanations include the following: weak
motivation to examine the reliability of eyewitness testimony because,
correctly or not, it is believed that wrongful convictions are rare, or
because sound statistical information is not readily available; 64 adherence
28 Colum. L. Rev. 432, 437-40 (1928) (adverse effect of stress on reliability of perceptions),
440 (suggesting that testimony admitted most readily and most frequently under the
spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule is that which is potentially the least
reliable); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory,
41 Harv. L. Rev. 860, 872 (1928) (risk that false recognition may generate false recall);
Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 712,
719 (1927) (The witness's "capacities of perception, memory, and narration, and his
disposition to make an honest use of them can be satisfactorily examined. Only his
opportunity and incentives for exercising his powers of perception are beyond effective
questioning.")
60. See supra note 2.
61. See, e.g., Grano, Kirby, Biggers & Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent? 72 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 723-24 (1974).
62. In the Geter case, a black employee of a high technology firm in a suburb of
Fort Worth, Texas, was convicted of armed robbery on the basis of eyewitness identi-
fications, in spite of the testimony by Geter's co-workers that he was working in the
office at a time which would have precluded the conclusion that he could have been at
the scene of the robbery. There were few blacks living in the area, or working there,
and there were allegations that the prosecution of the case was racially motivated. The
nationwide attention, led by the CBS television program 60 Minutes was helpful in obtaining
an order for a new trial, and after serving nearly 16 months of life sentence, Geter was
released pending a new trial. Three months later, after four of the five eyewitnesses
identified another man as the r'obber, the prosecution dropped the charges. See Baton
Rouge Morning Advocate, Mar. 22, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
63. See, e.g., Buckhout, supra note 5, at 5.
64. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 226-27.
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to the erroneous belief that "the human observer is a perfect recording
device-that everything that passes before his eyes is recorded and can
be pulled out by sharp questioning or 'refreshing one's memory;"' 65
adherence to the status quo because action on the basis of knowledge
that perceptual processes are "highly unreliable, or unpredictably biased,
or riddled by random error" would require extensive and very difficult
changes in the criminal justice system;66 and, continued treatment of
eyewitness evidence as direct evidence, in spite of the availability of
information which shows that additional inferences must be made from
eyewitness evidence to establish the facts, and that it is not different
from other forms of circumstantial evidence. 67 It cannot be said that
the legal system is unaware of the problems inherent in eyewitness
evidence; the treatment of some of the defects in the Wade-Gilbert-
Stovall trilogy by the United States Supreme Court suggests otherwise. 61
Whatever the reason for continued reliance on eyewitness evidence,
it is likely to continue. Given that the legal system probably will continue
to use such evidence, legal professionals should consider all possible
means of reducing the risk of wrongful convictions based on unreliable
eyewitness evidence. One means is the use of expert testimony by cog-
nitive psychologists. Others include the right to counsel and due process
requirements established by the Wade trilogy and subsequent cases, and
the traditional features of the adversary system, i.e., cross examination,
closing argument, and instructions to the jury. Another solution, exclu-
sion of eyewitness evidence, has been proposed by one psychologist, but
it does not seem to have gained the approval of anyone in the legal
profession. One commentator has suggested that because of its inherently
unreliable nature, eyewitness evidence be excluded "when it is the only
class of evidence available in a criminal trial," and "further . . . that
no official police action should be taken on the basis of eyewitness
testimony alone." ' 69 This rather extreme proposal has been questioned
by both psychologists and legal commentators. One critic noted that it
would not always be necessary to require that additional evidence be
offered, and concluded that the resulting "inability on the part of the
judge and jury to exercise discretion . . .might present more problems
65. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 5.
66. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 226.
67. Id. at 238.
68. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967
(1967). The concern of the legal profession is also reflected in the numerous books and
law review articles on the subject. See, e.g., Katz & Reid, supra note 35; J. Marshall,
Law and Psychology in Conflict (2d ed. 1980); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L.
Rev. 969 (1977); N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification (1982); P. Wall, supra note 2.
69. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 237.
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than it solves." 70 Another writer noted that exclusion under a balancing
test like that of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 goes too far because
eyewitness evidence may be the only link between the defendant and
the crime, "even an unreliable identification may be completely accurate"
and would be better than none at all in such instances, and finally,
exclusion would prevent the conviction of those who are actually guilty. 7'
It is difficult to understand how an unreliable identification can be
accurate, unless the commentator meant to say that an identification
may be accurate even though obtained through unreliable means; it is
even more difficult to understand how the application of the Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test 72 could be "going too far" unless
an abuse of discretion is found. In any case, it seems desirable to allow
the court the flexibility provided by the 403 balancing test since eye-
witness evidence arises in such a wide variety of situations, and a rigid
rule would unduly impede the operation of an already over-technical
system. The undesirability of a rigid rule would also arise in the case
of expert psychological testimony, and the courts have treated it as a
matter of trial court discretion. However, the results are problematical.
Treatment by the Courts
The leading case in this area is United States v. Amaral,'73 where
the court held that the trial court must consider four criteria in deter-
mining the admissibility of expert psychological testimony on the un-
reliability of eyewitness evidence: first, its probative value must outweigh
its prejudicial effects in terms of waste of time and confusion; second,
it must relate to proper subject matter, i.e., it must be beyond the full
understanding of the average layman; third, the witness must be qualified
as a expert, i.e., he must in fact be an expert and must be accepted
as such by the court; fourth, the testimony must conform to a generally
accepted scientific theory.7 4 The courts have relied on one or more of
these criteria, or similar considerations, in finding no abuse of discretion
70. L. Parker, Legal Psychology: Eyewitness Testimony, Jury Behavior 30 (1980).
71. Note, supra note 68, at 1001.
72. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
73. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
74. 488 F.2d at 1152-53. The general acceptance criterion is derived from the standard
adopted for the admission of scientific evidence in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). There the court stated: "While courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 293 F. at 1014.
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in the trial court's exclusion of such testimony, with few exceptions. 71
The courts have most frequently relied upon the. proper subject matter
criterion, either on the ground that the testimony would not aid the
jury76 or on the ground that the testimony would usurp the jury's
function. 77 Frequently, the courts have concluded that the testimony is
unnecessary because the traditional features of the adversary process
could adequately deal with the unreliability of eyewitness evidence: cross-
examination, closing argument, and special instructions to the jury.7 8
Some courts have used the general acceptance criterion to exclude the
testimony, 79 while others have concluded that the prejudicial effect out-
weighed the probative value based on findings of undue weight, 0 lack
of specificity to the particular eyewitness,"' and confusion of the issues,
waste of time or undue delay.12
75. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 291-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218-24 (1983)
(testimony admitted under Amaral criteria on basis of factual distinctions from other
cases); Hampton v. State, 92 Wisc. 2d 450, 461, 285 N.W.2d 868, 873 (1979) (holding
that expert psychologist's testimony restricted to listing the factors affecting human per-
ception, excluding his testimony as it related to the particular eyewitness's identification).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nom Davis v. United States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); People v. Lawson, 37 Colo. App.
442, 445, 551 P.2d 206, 209 (1976); State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 521-22, 601 P.2d 1125,
1128 (1979).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1976); Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1061, 594 S.W.2d 24,
28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1204 (Me. 1977).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 57 (1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3489 (1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300
(1982) (cross examination); Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1329 (1984) (cross-examination and cautionary instruction); People v. Johnson,
97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1069, 423 N.E.2d 1206, 1216-17 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 951
(1982) (cross-examination and closing argument); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395,
635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981) (cross-examination, closing argument, and cautionary instruc-
tion); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980) (decision not to prosecute
on the basis of apparently unreliable evidence, cross-examination, closing argument, cau-
tionary instruction, and exclusion if identification procedures are unduly suggestive)..
79. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st. Cir. 1979); United States v.
Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); People
v. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 593-94, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227, 232 (County Ct. 1983).
80. See, e.g., State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982); Porter v. State, 94
Nev. 142, 148, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982); People v.
Bradley, 115 Cal. App. 3d 744, 751-52, 171 Cal. Rptr. 487, 491 (1981); People v. Plascencia,
140 Cal. App. 3d 853, 859, 189 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (1983) (hrg. granted July 14, 1983);
Rodriguez v. State, 413 So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Jones v. State,
232 Ga. 762, 765, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d
513, 522 (Ky. 1972).
82. See, e.g., State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1203-04 (Me. 1977); Commonwealth
v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 100-01, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1983); Hampton v. State, 92
Wis. 2d 450, 460-61, 285 N.W.2d 868, 873 (1979) (dictum).
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The Amaral approach is not without its problems, however. It is
not analytically precise because it regards the probative value-prejudicial
effect balancing test as just another criterion to be used along with the
other three, which are merely factors which bear on the probative value-
prejudicial effect inquiry. The better approach would be to determine
whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effects by consid-
ering the other criteria listed in Amaral, along with any other aspects
of the case that bear on the probative value or prejudicial effects of
the expert testimony.
Generally, Amaral has been criticized for its failure to consider the
policy implications or to provide legal analysis of the merits of expert
psychological testimony and for its failure to establish guidelines for
the trial courts to follow in exercising their discretion in this area.83
More specifically, the proper-subject-matter and the general-acceptance
criteria each has significant deficiencies.
Under the proper subject matter criterion, the courts have generally
adopted one or both of two different but related interpretations: beyond
the ken of the average layman, and invasion of the jury's province.14
Under the beyond-the-ken test, the courts do not admit the testimony
unless it is shown that it would aid the jury in understanding the issues.
In McCormick's words, it "must be so distinctively related to some
science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of
the average layman." 85 This test has been interpreted as requiring merely
"that the expert have a greater degree of understanding of the subject
than the jury so that the offered testimony would enable the jury to
evaluate the facts more intelligently." '8 6 The question then is whether
cognitive psychologists have a greater understanding of the vagaries of
eyewitness behavior than does the average layman. It is apparent from
a study of the cases that the majority of the courts which have treated
the issue do not think S0.87 This reluctance to accept what the experi-
mental cognitive psychologists have to offer is reflected in the legal
profession and law enforcement circles. One study shows that "prose-
cuting attorneys and law officers are extremely opposed to its utilization
in court, prosecutors significantly more so than the law officers." 8 This
resistance has been traced in part to the legal profession's experience
with expert testimony by psychiatrists and other mental health specialists:
83. Note, supra note 68, at 1014.
84. Id. at 1016.
85. McCormick on Evidence, § 13, at 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited to this edition without reference to editor].
86. Note, supra note 68, at 1016. See also McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 33.
87. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 76.
88. Brigham & WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and Law Enforcement Personnel
on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & Hum. Behav. 337, 348 (1983).
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Part of this problem, of course, is tied fundamentally to the
limited knowledge of human behavior that is available. I am
referring to the limited hard evidence that has accumlated, not-
withstanding the great number of studies and articles that have
been published on the subject. For years, mental health experts
have vastly oversold their product in the market place ...
The mystique of psychiatry has been fueled by the exhorbitant
fees ($50.00 an hour) that many charge and the M.D. or Ph.D.
credential tacked on the wall.8 9
The same writer goes on to argue that the judicial system should not
allow its experience with the mental health experts such as psychiatrists
to affect its attitude toward accepting "bona fide scientific psychological
evidence as it bears on problems such as eyewitness testimony." 90
What then should the legal system do when cognitive psychologists
themselves are divided on whether their research is useful to the judicial
system? On the one hand, there is the argument that "even though an
all encompassing theoretical framework has yet to be developed, there
is enough research literature to begin closely questioning the judicial
system's reliance on the accuracy of eyewitnesses," and that for almost
a century, experimental psychologists have been developing "methodo-
logically sound data about human perception and memory" so that they
can make substantial contributions in this area. 9' On the other hand
there is the argument that the experimental techniques used by the
psychologists "are not designed to answer applied questions, and worse,
that (1) their experimental results can prove very misleading when ge-
neralisations for common practice are based on them," '92 primarily be-
cause the experiments focus on groups rather than individuals, 93 (2) they
can tell only whether an effect occurs but not how significant it is,94
(3) they frequently involve only "tenuous abstractions of real-life situ-
ations," 95 (4) they neglect successful performance, 96 and (5) the strategy
of investigating the effects of only one variable at a time ignores the
interactions between many variables that occur in reality. 97 Between these
two extremes is the argument that, while we should be skeptical about
89. L. Parker, supra note 70, at 6.
90. Id. at 8.
91. C. Bartol, supra note 17, at 169.
92. Rabbitt, Applying Human Experimental Psychology to Legal Questions About
Evidence, in Psychology in Legal Contexts, Applications and Limitations 3, 4-5 (S. Lloyd-
Bostock ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Psychology in Legal Contexts].
93. Id. at 9-10.
94. Id. at 8-9.
95. Id. at 8 (emphasis deleted).
96. Id. at 10-11.
97. Id. at 5-6.
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the trustworthiness of the experimental findings, 98 we should also rec-
ognize that generally,
psychology has benefited the legal profession by disclosing that
humans are fallible and quite limited processors of information,
thus dispelling the common-sense belief that testimony will be
correct as long as the witness is mentally normal and has the
intention of telling the truth. 99
In light of this split of opinion among the experimental psychologists
themselves, it is not surprising that the courts are reluctant to accept
their findings. However, one feature of the experimental results indicates
that they may be useful to the legal system after all. One criticism
aimed at the experiments is that they never involve real crimes and thus
do not accurately reflect the stress, excitement and other aspects of a
crime.00 However, it has been pointed out that
any deficits shown under artificially controlled laboratory con-
ditions will give an underestimate of such deficits in real life.
This means that if an observer's testimony is poor in the lab-
oratory it will be poorer still in a real life situation where
numerous other factors are operating to distort memory for such
things as a seen criminal or a set of criminal actions.10
Thus, it seems that an experimental psychologist could testify that given
results represent the best that could be expected under the circumstances
of the experiment and that better performance in real life could not be
expected. Whether he should be allowed to testify depends on whether
such results are common knowledge.
While the courts believe that such results are common knowledge,
there are data which suggest that neither laymen nor members of the
legal profession nor law enforcement personnel, are fully aware of the
factors which may render eyewitness evidence unreliable. One study
surveyed the comparative understanding of such factors among lawyers,
law students, judges, potential lay jurors and expert psychologists. °2 It
98. Clifford, Towards a More Realistic Appraisal of the Psychology of Testimony,
in Psychology in Legal Contexts, supra note 92, at 19, 23.
99. Id. at 20.
100. See, e.g., State v. Stucke, where the court noted that "the crimes are staged [in
the experiments]; the person acting as the criminal and very often the victim are both
actors. No actual crime has ever been an issue in [the] studies and none of [the] victims
have been shot in [the] staged crimes." The clear implication of this statement is that
the experiments are not sufficiently realistic to give results that can help the jury. 419
So. 2d at 944.
101. Clifford, supra note 47, at 168. See also Goldstein, supra note 41, at 232.
102. Yarmey & Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of
Common Sense?, in Evaluating Witness Evidence 13 (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford ed.
1983).
[Vol.45
COMMENTS
tested their knowledge of the effects of stress and level of violence,
weapon focus, time estimation, cross-racial identification, police iden-
tification, lineup identification, subjective confidence of eyewitness, ques-
tion wording, eyewitness testimony and descriptions by the elderly,
recognition by the elderly, person identification by the elderly, responses
by children in giving eyewitness evidence, and voice identification. Al-
though the results were mixed, the experts were shown to have signif-
icantly greater understanding of nearly all of the factors studied. In
some cases the legal professionals were shown to share the same in-
accurate beliefs as the potential jurors. A different study disclosed that
prosecutors and police officers "regard eyewitness identification as rel-
atively accurate and feel that its importance is appropriately emphasized
by judges and jurors," while defense attorneys were found to regard
eyewitness identification as inaccurate and overemphasized by the fact-
finder. 0 13 Yet another study suggests that prospective jurors significantly
overestimate the success rate of eyewitness identifications, and are also
unaware of the sources of error in such identifications.' 4
In light of these empirical findings, the notion that experimental
psychologists can be of no aid to the jury must be regarded with some
skepticism, and the courts' findings under the "common understanding"
version of the proper-subject-matter test must be viewed as having lost
much of their force. The same can be said of the invasion-of-the-jury's-
function argument, but much more forcefully. Wigmore declared this
basis for excluding such testimony to be misleading, unsound and a
"mere bit of empty rhetoric.''" 10  He noted that this argument cannot
be a basis for excluding expert testimony because there is really no
attempt to usurp the jury's function, and even if there were, it could
not be done, simply because the jury may in any case choose to ignore
the expert's testimony.'0 6 This criticism was also reflected in the approach
taken in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 0 7 Finally, one court has noted
the effect of the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 on this
interpretation. In United States v. Watson,08 the court noted that it
need not rely on the invasion-of-the-jury's-province rationale because
103. Brigham & WolfsKeil, supra note 88, at 346-47.
104. Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy
of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & Hum. Behav. 19, 29 (1983). See also Deffenbacher
& Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Eyewitness Behavior? 6 L. & Hum.
Behav. 15, 24-25 (1982). For additional discussion of whether expert testimony by psy-
chologists can benefit the jury see I. Horowitz & T. Willing, supra note 14, at 238-241.
105. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1920, at 18 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1978).
106. Id. at 18-19. See also 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 105, § 673, at 936.
107. See Fed. R. Evid. 704 and Advisory Committee Notes.
108. 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
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Rule 704 removed the objection to otherwise admissible opinion testi-
mony on the ground that "it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact." 10 9
The requirement that the testimony conform to a generally accepted
explanatory theory is essentially an application of the Frye test for
admissibility of scientific evidence. In Frye v. United States the court
held that the admissibility of scientific expert opinion testimony would
depend on whether the underlying scientific principles were generally
accepted within the relevant field of science.' 0 The viability of the Frye
test itself has been seriously questioned"' and in some applications it
has been abandoned altogether." 2 In the context of expert psychological
testimony on eyewitness unreliability, it has been argued that the Frye
test should not apply because (1) it has not been applied to medical
and psychiatric testimony, and thus by analogy, should not be applied
here;" 3 and (2) it is not relevant in the present context because such
testimony does not deal with novel devices which the jury could regard
as conclusive."14 Some courts have rejected or ignored the Frye test in
admitting expert testimony." 5 In Louisiana, the Frye test was rejected
in favor of the balancing approach espoused by McCormick in dealing
with the admissibility of polygraph results," 6 and this approach was
followed in the case of hypnotically induced testimony."1 7 Thus, the
usefulness in Louisiana of the Amaral requirement of conformity to a
generally accepted theory is highly questionable.
These arguments leave only the balancing test and the qualifications
requirement of the Amaral criteria with unquestionable applicability in
this context. That both of these criteria have continuing usefulness hardly
anyone could doubt. The balancing test now forms the core of evidence
law, both federal and state,"' and it can hardly be suggested that it
should be waived for expert psychological testimony when the psychol-
ogists themselves as a group are uncertain as to the usefulness of their
experimental results to the judicial system. Likewise, no one is likely
109. Id. at 369 n.5.
110. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra note 74.
111. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980). See also 22 C. Wright & K.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5168, at 88-91 (1978) (Frye test
cannot be justified under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
112. See the discussion in McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 605-08.
113. Note, supra note 68, at 1022.
114. Id. at 1022-23.
115. See McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 606-07 nn.21 & 23.
116. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979).
117. State v. Culpepper, 434 So. 2d 76, 82-83 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
118. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
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to suggest, at least not seriously, that the qualifications requirement be
waived for this group of experts. However, it has been suggested that,
in assessing the alleged expert's qualifications, the court should very
closely scrutinize the witness's degrees, his empirical experience, and his
publications record. 1 9
However, should defense counsel persuade the trial court that these
major arguments against admission of expert psychological testimony on
eyewitness unreliability are no longer persuasive, he must still convince
the court that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects. In
that context, the case for admission can be strengthened by pointing
out the weaknesses of the alternatives which the courts have relied upon
to safeguard against eyewitness unreliability.
Alternatives to Expert Psychological Testimony
It has been argued that the constitutionally-based safeguards estab-
lished by the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy are insufficient because first,
the attorney may not be sufficiently aware of all of the factors which
could cause misidentification, and second, because the presence of coun-
sel at the line-up cannot eliminate or weaken those factors which are
unrelated to the identification procedure itself. 2 °
The effectiveness of cross-examination as a safeguard against misi-
dentification is lessened by the fact that an unreliable eyewitness, because
he is unaware of the defects in his own perception and memory processes,
honestly believes that he is relating accurate observations and memories.
As a result, his apparent unshakeable belief in his testimony and his
demeanor will convey only sincerity and certainty to the trier of fact.' 2 '
Also, the effectiveness of cross-examination will depend on the cross-
examining attorney's depth of understanding in this area. As indicated
earlier, there is some question as to whether the legal profession has
sufficient understanding of the nuances of eyewitness behavior to allow
the kind of cross-examination needed.' 22 In addition, one study suggests
that jurors are generally unable to distinguish between accurate and
inaccurate witnesses based upon cross-examination. The results indicated
a small but significant benefit from the use of leading questions on
cross-examination, but even in that case the jurors accorded greater
credibility to the eyewitnesses.' 23
Several courts and commentators have addressed the usefulness of a
119. Note, supra note 68, at 1014-16.
120. Id. at 994.
121. Id. at 995.
122. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
123. Rahaim & Brodsky, Empirical Evidence versus Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer
Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 L. & Psychology Rev. 1, 7 (1982).
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cautionary instruction to the jury as a safeguard against reliance on
unreliable eyewitness evidence. 124 The effectiveness of such cautionary
instructions depends on the level of understanding of the lawyers who
must request them, the judges who give them, and the jurors who must
understand and apply them. Because lawyers and judges are not experts
in the psychology of eyewitnesses, they are unable to give the jury all
of the information necessary for an intelligent application of such an
instruction. 12  Also, the jury may choose to ignore the instruction, es-
pecially if the lawyers and the judge have not given them sufficient
information to apply the instruction intelligently. 2 6 Expert psychological
testimony is seemingly necessary for an instruction to be effective because
the jury must be apprised of what factors in the case are likely to have
affected eyewitness reliability and how those factors might have affected
it. 127
The effectiveness of oral argument as a safeguard is lessened by the
same factors as is that of cautionary instructions-unless the attorneys
have adequate understanding of the factors affecting eyewitness relia-
bility, they may not be as persuasive as they could be. The admission
of expert testimony would increase the potential effectiveness of oral
argument in conveying to the jury the problems inherent in eyewitness
evidence.
Thus, it could forcefully be argued that expert psychological testimony
would be of significant help, both directly and as an aid to the traditional
features of the adversary process. However, this does not mean that
such an expert could not be of help without testifying. There seem to
be several points in the course of a criminal case at which the expert
cognitive psychologist could be of service to the defense.
The Cognitive Psychologist and the Defense
When the defense is faced with potentially unreliable eyewitness
evidence, there are three major occasions on which the assistance of a
cognitive psychologist might be used, including (1) pretrial investigation
and discovery, (2) cross-examination of the prosecution's eyewitness(es),
and (3) direct testimony by the psychologist to impeach the eyewitness(es)'
testimony. 12
124. See particularly the model instruction suggested in United States v. Telfaire, 469
F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also, e.g., State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395-99,
635 P.2d 1236, 1243-45 (1981); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 302, 391
N.E.2d 889, 893 (1979); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 461-64, 285 N.W.2d 868,
874-75 (1979).
125. Note, supra note 68, at 1005.
126. Id.
127. Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 Dick. L. Rev. 465,
483 (1978).
128. See, e.g., F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Fundamentals of Criminal Advocacy §§ 160-
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1. Pretrial Investigation and Discovery. An expert psychologist should
be very helpful in analyzing eyewitnesses' pretrial statements obtained
directly through interviews or through other avenues of discovery. Gen-
erally, the expert should be present during any interviews of eyewitnesses
or, should he not be able to attend, he should assist the defense attorney
in designing questions to be asked. Either of these types of assistance
should allow the interview to focus on those circumstances of the case
which are most significant for the reliability of the eyewitness's account.
Information thus obtained should prove very useful at trial during cross-
examination of the eyewitness and during the expert's testimony, should
he be allowed to testify. By focusing on a few key variables it might
be possible to reduce the scope of the potential expert testimony, thus
weakening the force of any objection on the ground of undue con-
sumption of time.
If possible, the expert should visit the scene of the crime under
conditions identical or highly similar to those of the crime itself. These
activities should give the psychologist some firsthand knowledge of the
case and thereby reduce the need to rely on, and thus avoid problems
associated with, hypothetical questions 2 9 during direct examination if
the expert is allowed to testify. This visit may also increase the chances
of convincing the court to admit the expert testimony since it would
increase its probative value.13 0
If the eyewitness is a potential defense witness, there should, of
course, be no discovery problems in procuring an interview. In this case,
the participation by the psychologist may aid defense counsel in assessing
the reliability of the eyewitness's testimony and in identifying any weak
points that the prosecution might key on. Also, this participation should
aid in developing a rehabilitation strategy should the prosecution be
allowed to use a similar expert to impeach the defense eyewitness's
testimony.
If the eyewitness is a prosecution witness, discovery problems must
be overcome before an interview can be obtained. Article 723 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure states that prosecution reports,
memoranda and other similar materials are not discoverable by the
defendant.' 3' These include statements made to the prosecution by wit-
nesses or prospective witnesses other than the defendant. However, the
162 (1974). Such an expert might also be of use in preparing oral arguments or in drafting
cautionary instructions to be submitted to the court. On cautionary instructions see supra
notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of hypothetical questions and the associated problems see
McCormick on Evidence §§ 14 & 16.
130. In pointing out the deficiencies of expert psychological testimony as offered at
trial, some courts have noted that the expert did not intend to testify as to the unreliability
of the particular eyewitness testimony and offered only a description of the general
unreliability of eyewitness evidence. See cases cited supra note 81.
131. "Except as provided in Articles 716, 718, 721, and 722, this Chapter does not
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courts have created some exceptions to this rule and have held that the
defendant may not be denied access to exculpatory statements by other
witnesses as long as those statements are material,3 2 and that where the
defendant seeks discovery of prior statements by a chief prosecution
witness whose testimony bears directly on the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence, the trial court should make an in camera inspection of the
statements to determine whether the information is favorable to the
defendant and, if so, whether it is material to the defendant's guilt or
punishment.'33 Such an in camera inspection of the statements may
provide another opportunity for the defense to benefit from an expert
psychologist's expertise. Even if not allowed to testify at trial, the expert
could prove useful if he can give the trial judge specific information,
orally or in brief, pointing out particular factors which might render
the eyewitness evidence unreliable, and thus make it essential that the
defense have access to the statements in order to make out an adequate
defense.
Before the defense can interview prosecution witnesses, it must obtain
their names and addresses. The courts have held that while the defendant
is not entitled to the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses,
Article 723 does not prohibit their discovery and that the trial court
has discretion to order their discovery where failure to do so would
jeopardize the defendant's fundamental rights, specifically, his right to
prepare an adequate defense. 34 The defendant must show that "there
exist peculiar and distinctive reasons why fundamental fairness dictates
discovery" of names, addresses and telephone numbers of prosecution
witnesses. 33 Also, the defendant's request must be specific as to why
the information is essential. 3 6 Having to overcome this burden presents
yet another opportunity for defense counsel to benefit from the assistance
of an expert psychologist who may be able to strengthen counsel's
arguments that the potential for misidentification is great enough to
justify discovery of the identity of the prosecution's eyewitnesses so that
the defense can interview them, thus allowing the defense an opportunity
to prepare an adequate defense.3 7 In this context, the defense could
authorize the discovery . . .of statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses,
other than the defendant, to the district attorney, or to agents of the state." La. Code
Crim. P. art. 723.
132. See State v. Landry, 381 So. 2d 462, 465 (La. 1980).
133. See State v. Ates, 418 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (La. 1982).
134. See State v. Waiters, 408 So. 2d 1337, 1339-40 (La. 1982).
135. State v. Washington, 411 So. 2d 451 (La. 1982).
136. State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 948 (La. 1982).
137. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 865 (1969) (Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial by prosecutor's
preventing the defense from interviewing prosecution eyewitnesses.).
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rely on State v. Falkins,3 where the supreme court concluded that where
the defendant specifically requests information as to whether exculpatory
identification evidence exists, it is reversible error for the trial court to
uphold the prosecution's failure to disclose it, especially if the state's
entire case depends on the eyewitness evidence. 3 9 In that case, the
prosecution failed to disclose, upon specific request by the defense, that
two of the state's eyewitnesses had misidentified one of the robbers.
The court found this information to be sufficiently material to have
created a reasonable doubt if brought to the jury's attention, and con-
cluded that the defendant had been denied a fair trial because the
conviction was based solely on the eyewitness evidence. 140 The court held
the denial of defendant's request to be reversible error.' 4'
2. Cross-examination. The next opportunity to benefit from the
expert psychologist's assistance is during the cross-examination of the
prosecution's eyewitness(es). To the extent that the defense is successful
in discovering the eyewitness(es)'s pre-trial statements or in interviewing
them, the psychologist may be able to assist counsel in preparing an
effective cross-examination which focuses on the particular aspects of
the case which suggest unreliability. 42 If the expert is allowed to observe
the eyewitness's testimony on direct examination during the state's case
in chief, his assistance may also be useful in developing questions for
cross-examination on matters brought out for the first time on direct
examination.
3. Direct expert testimony. Ultimately, the most effective use of the
expert psychologist would be direct testimony in the defense's case-in-
chief to impeach the prosecution's eyewitness evidence. To be most
effective, such testimony should concentrate only on those factors which
are most likely to have affected the eyewitness(es) in the case. Extended
treatment of eyewitness unreliability in general could cause undue con-
sumption of time and confusion of the issues; a proffer of such broad
testimony is much less likely to overcome an objection, as an examination
of the cases indicates.' 3 Therefore, where there is sufficient information
available about the particular eyewitness and the circumstances of his
observations, the expert's testimony should be as specific as possible
and should relate only to those factors which affect the particular
138. 356 So. 2d 415 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978).
139. Id. at 417-19.
140. Id. at 418-19.
141. Id.
142. La. R.S. 15:280 (1981) allows cross-examination on the whole case once the
witness testifies as to any aspect of the case. Thus, even if the prosecution declines to
bring out aspects of the eyewitness evidence bearing on unreliability, the defense can do
so on crossexamination.
143. See cases cited supra notes 81-82.
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eyewitness's reliability. Such testimony is likely to have a better chance
of surviving an 9objection if it can be based on the psychologist's own
examination of the eyewitness and observation of the crime scene under
conditions which approximate as closely as possible those conditions
which existed at the time of the eyewitness's observations. However, if
that is not possible, the testimony could be based on hypothetical
questions 144 or on information obtained from other sources., 45 Ideally,
the expert psychologist should be one who has done extensive empirical
research on the particular unreliability-inducing factors present in the
case. This would enhance the testimony's probative value as well as
reduce the tendency to consume time and confuse the issues. In addition,
it could be argued that the expert psychologist should also be allowed
to base his opinion partly on the empirical research of other cognitive
psychologists. 146
Conclusion
The foregoing suggests that cognitive psychologists can assist the
defense in a criminal case in a number of ways. While it might be
argued, as it has been by a number of psychologists and some legal
commentators, that such assistance should take the form of expert
testimony as a matter of law, such a result is undesirable for a number
of reasons.
First, it is not obvious that such testimony will always be of any
help. For instance, there may be many cases in which the witness or
victim is well-aquainted with the perpetrator and had an excellent op-
portunity to observe the perpetrator. In those cases, the probative value
would probably be more than offset by the extra consumption of time
144. See State v. Schouest, 351 So. 2d 462, 467 (La. 1977) (expert opinion not based
on facts within the witness's personal knowledge may be adduced via hypothetical questions
which assume only facts which the evidence proves or tends to prove, and hypothetical
question is not permissible if it assumes facts not supported by the record.).
145. See, e.g., State v. Austin, 282 So. 2d 711, 712 (La. 1973) ("It is no bar to an
expert's testimony that he obtained information from other persons. Expert opinion might
even be based on hypothetical situations."); State v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 1049, 1051-52
(La. 1979) (Rule that a medical expert's opinion can be based partly on tests and
examinations done by others in reaching his opinion applies equally to psychologists, when
they testify in an area in which they are specially trained and experienced.). See also Fed.
R. Evid. 703.
146. See Fed. R. Evid. 703; State v. Titus, 358 So. 2d 912, 915 (La. 1977) (Expert
witness may base his opinion testimony on findings of another expert as long as those
findings conform to other findings published in the literature.). But see State v. Chalaire,
251 La. 984, 988-89, 207 So. 2d 767, 768-69 (1968) (Expert witness may give opinion
testimony where the questions involve knowledge obtained only through special training
or experience, and he must state the facts which form the basis of those opinions; but
such testimony may not be based on opinions of another expert in the same field who
has not testified at trial.).
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and confusion of the issues that admission of expert psychological tes-
timony might entail, especially if there is also a significant amount of
other evidence implicating the defendant. Indeed, in many such cases
the help of a cognitive psychologist may not be necessary at all, while
in others assistance in one or more of the other forms outlined above
may be sufficient. The usefulness of a cognitive psychologist seems to
depend on two factors: one, the significance of eyewitness evidence in
the prosecution's case, and two, the likelihood of unreliability or mis-
identification. The greater the significance and the higher the likelihood
of unreliability, the greater will be the number of ways in which the
cognitive psychologist may be of help to the defense. It would seem
that expert testimony would be called for only in cases where the
eyewitness evidence dominates the prosecution's case and where misi-
dentification is all but certain. 147
Second, while the advances in experimental cognitive psychology
have reached a stage at which that field may be of some help to the
legal system, it has not been shown to have advanced sufficiently to
justify the abandonment of the balancing test of admissibility. That the
balancing test is adequate is suggested by the fact that even the four
Amaral criteria have been applied in one case to reverse a lower court's
exclusion of such testimony. In State v. Chapple,141 the Arizona Supreme
Court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding
such testimony where there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to
link the defendant to the murders other than the identifications made
by eyewitnesses more than one year after the crime. The eyewitnesses
147. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P. 2d 1208 (1983) and discussion
of that case in text accompanying note 148 infra. See also People v. McDonald, 690
P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) a capital murder case in which six
prosecution eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the murderer, one prosecution eyew-
itness testified that the defendant was not the murderer, and six defense witnesses testified
that the defendant was out of the state at the time of the crime. The defense offered
postcards and records of telephone calls to assist in establishing the alibi. The California
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that the trial court's exclusion of expert
psychological testimony offered by the defense was an abuse of discretion, stating that
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the
prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it
independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on
specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the
accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or
understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony.
The six prosecution eyewitnesses identifying the defendant as the culprit testified with
varying degrees of certainty, and with numerous discrepancies. The opinion is silent as
to whether the prosecution offered any other evidence to support the eyewitness testimony.
In deciding that the error was not harmless, the court noted that the exclusion of the
expert testimony undermined the defendant's principal defense.
148. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P. 2d 1208 (1983).
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had failed to identify the defendant as either of the two assailants within
one month of the crime, and the police had failed to pursue leads
produced by a tentative identification of someone other than the de-
fendant as the second perpetrator. This court applied the Amaral criteria
and found that all of them had been fulfilled. This case at least suggests
that the less onerous burden of the simple balancing test and the qual-
ifications requirement could be overcome under less restrictive factual
circumstances.
Defense counsel should be aware of the ways in which a cognitive
psychologist can aid in preparing and presenting a defense, but given
the expense and consumption of time involved, they should use care in
deciding whether to seek such assistance.
Frederick E. Chemay
